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Region and Community: Keywords in British Political Discourse1 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is about keywords in two senses. Briefly and for 
introductory purposes, it is about the Welsh born social critic 
and novelist Raymond Williams' book Keywords: A vocabulary of 
culture and society. Secondly, it deals with some keywords in 
present-day British political discourse, especially 'community' 
and 'region' and the issues and debates that underlie or result 
from the way they are used.   
 
Raymond Williams (1921-88) has always seemed a good starting-
point for discussions of British society. Born in Wales in a 
working-class family, he travelled via grammar school, Trinity 
College Cambridge, military service in the Second World War, 
adult education tutor, to a fellowship at Jesus College 
Cambridge. He was a typical representative of his own and those 
later generations who entered British academic life from a 
working-class background; throughout his life he was active on 
the British left, and he later became associated with Welsh 
nationalism. As an individual he crossed some of the cultural 
borders of British society, both in terms of class and 
nationality.   
 
This cross-cultural experience was a major source of inspiration 
in his writing, and contributed to making him what might be 
characterised as an early interdisciplinary writer. His first 
book Culture and Society: Coleridge to Orwell (1958) was 
inspired by his finding, on returning from the army to Cambridge 
in 1945, an apparent rise in the use of the word 'culture' and 
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with different meanings from what he had noticed before.  
 
This set him off on tracing the word and the idea of culture and 
finally on writing his 'account and (..) interpretation of our 
responses in thought and feeling to the changes in English 
society since the late eighteenth century' (Williams 
1958:foreword), i.e. since the Industrial Revolution. The book 
covers ground that is the natural subject of several 
disciplines, and it has consequently defied classification and 
been interchangably labelled cultural history, historical 
semantics, history of ideas, social criticism, literary history 
and sociology. In his original manuscript Raymond Williams had 
included an appendix of keywords, which, however, was left out 
for publication and only appeared 18 years later in its own 
right as his Keywords.   
 
On rereading his introduction, it has struck me that he is an 
early discourse analyst, or rather, a forerunner of discourse 
analysis in that a number of the insights that he bases his 
survey of vocabulary on are similar to latter-day accounts of 
discourse analysis.2   
 
A programmatic statement in the introduction is that 'it is a 
central aim of this book to show that some important social and 
historical processes occur within language, in ways which 
indicate how integral the problems of meanings and of 
relationships really are' (Williams, 1976:22). Social processes 
are reflected in language, if not even partly constituted in 
language use.  
 
There's a recognition that reference to a dictionary for the 
meaning of a word is only a starting-point; that the meaning of 
words depend on their context and their interconnection and co-
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occurence with other words in clusters, such as the meanings of 
'nation' and 'region' in various contexts, and their 
interrelations. 
 
The introduction stresses the importance, in thinking through 
and analysing problems, of 'being conscious of the words as 
elements of the problems', evidently without dispensing with 
other types of analysis, and recognizing 'that to understand the 
complexities of the meanings of class contributes very little to 
the resolution of actual class disputes and class struggles' 
(Williams, 1976:24).  
 
By tracing the development of individual words, Raymond Williams 
points to the dynamics of language and meanings, and to the 
continuities and discontinuities in use. The vocabulary studied 
are central words in culture and society, the humanities and 
social science. For example, the entries under A are 'aestetic', 
'alienation', 'anarchism', 'anthropology' and 'art'. This is of 
course one man's choice in the light of a specific project, but 
it also seems an interesting reflection of its period in that a 
number of additional entries were added for the second edition 
in 1983, among them 'development', 'ecology', 'ethnic', 
'expert', 'liberation', 'technology' and 'western'. Equally it 
would seem that in a latter-day revision there would be no 
escaping the inclusion of 'international', 'global', 'European' 
and 'identity'. 
 
To return to the original comparison with discourse analysis 
this is not discourse analysis in an e.g. Faircloughian sense. 
It is concerned with vocabulary and the ideas and social 
processes that lie behind the vocabulary and which it to some 
degree constitutes. While vocabulary is only one of the 
properties of texts investigated in discourse analysis in 
addition to e.g. syntax, information structure, and cohesion, 
there is an evident link in the recognition of the close 
interconnection between language and society and how, in our use 
of language, we contribute to shaping the world we inhabit. 
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This is the premiss of the rest of the paper. It is not a 
detailed discourse analysis, but a look at a cluster of words 
central to present-day British political discourse and the 
potentially significant variations in their use in an attempt to 
present aspects of an important political debate. This is the 
debate about the entire constitutional set-up of Britain; about 
democracy and efficiency - economic and administrative -, the 
trade-off between them, and how they relate to local and 
national identities in Great Britain.  
 
One central concern in these debates is that political power in 
Britain is too concentrated; that the British state is overly 
centralized. Another is that popular involvement in the 
political process is too low; that citizen participation should 
be promoted. Both are concerned with the democratic process and 
a perceived low level of democracy. One is mostly a top-down 
perspective: powers need to be dispersed, devolved, 
decentralized, whereas the other could be characterized as a 
more bottom-up perspective: the proverbial (wo)man on the floor 
needs to get a bigger say, to gain more direct influence on 
decision-making. These are essentially political arguments.  
 
A second overall concern is to do with the need to coordinate 
planning at a sub-national and a supra-local level; the need for 
supervision and provision of services at some sort of 
intermediate level. Another is for coordinating local efforts to 
achieve economies of scale; to obtain rationalization or - in a 
different terminology - a modernization of local (government) 
services. Again you might say that there is both a top-down and 
a bottom-up perspective. On a national level there is a need to 
administer various services more locally, and on a local level 
there is a need to join forces to do things more efficiently. In 
both, an argument of administrative efficiency takes precedence. 
 
Placed between these two overall concerns is one which involves 
aspects of both democracy and (economic) efficiency, that of how 
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to remedy an insufficient and unevenly distributed national 
growth. The argument that a reform of British political 
structures is a precondition for the reversal of economic 
decline is an old one in British academic writing3 and has 
recently been restated by Will Hutton, former columnist in the 
Guardian, now editor of the Observer, in his book The state 
we're in (1995). 
 
The two examples of this debate presented here are to do with 
the process of local government reform and with the potential 
political and administrative regionalisation of Britain, both 
underlying the overall debate. The discussions are centred 
around the keywords of community and region/al/ism, which - it 
can be argued along with Raymond Williams - may only be 
understood in their encounter with each other and with other 
terms such as nation, union, devolution, sovereignty, etc. 
 
Community 
 
'Community' takes up a prominent place in the English language, 
and constitutes one of the battlefields where political ideas 
and institutional structures are contested and fought over. 
However, 'community' has a very special flavour (Williams, 
1976): 
 'Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe 
an existing set of relationships, or the warmly persuasive 
word to describe an alternative set of relationships. What 
is most important, perhaps, is that unlike all other terms 
of social organization (state, nation, society, etc) it 
seems never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given 
any positive opposing or distinguishing term' 
 
What Williams points to is that, under the almost unfailingly 
warm persuasive surface, community seems open to endless 
ideological investment and appropriation, of a potentially 
contradictory nature. 'Community', 'natural community' and 
'sense of community' have been central notions in the review of 
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the local government structure of England, which has now gone on 
for 5 years, and in applying these terms, the Local Government 
Commission is battling with their underlying contradictions and 
trying to make sense of the wider social trends against which 
they should be seen. 
 
The whole process of restructuring local government in England 
was set in motion in 1991-1992 by the then Secretary of the 
Environment Michael Heseltine and is most often interpreted as a 
grand plan of his, following his failure to win the leadership 
contest in the Conservative Party. As is so often the case with 
the well-laid and grand schemes of great men, they are passed on 
to someone else for implementation, which was also the case 
here, in that Michael Heseltine moved on to new responsibilities 
and left subsequent and less enthusiastic secretaries of the 
Environment with the task. In addition, the day-to-day 
activities were placed with the Local Government Commission of 
England, set up in July 1992 as the successor to the former 
Local Government Boundary Commission, which was to review all of 
shire England and recommend to the Secretary of State. The whole 
review was very much premised on the idea that the existing two-
tier structure should be abandoned in favour of an essentially 
unitary structure and a move towards socalled enabling 
authorities that would have responsibility for securing the 
provision of services rather than actually providing them. 
   
In its 1991 consultation paper on the structure of local 
government in England the government restates its commitment to 
the efficient delivery of services and points out that there is 
not an ideal size of authority or inherent logic in the two-tier 
structure for service delivery purposes. Therefore, the 
Department of the Environment called for the introduction of 
unitary authorities which would 'offer the opportunity of 
relating the structure of local government more closely to 
communities with which people identify' and 'reflect local 
people's own sense of identity with the community in which they 
live' (Department of the Environment, 1991:par. 26 and 27).  
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A more precise definition of what might constitute the basis of 
loyalty to and identification with a certain community does not 
emerge from the consultation paper. However, the concept is 
elaborated on in the policy guidance to the Local Government 
Commission. Paragraph 4 of the Policy Guidance reads: 
 'Local authorities should be based on natural communities. 
The Commission should assess the extent and strength of 
local peoples's loyalties and identities, and their 
interests. It will use its own judgement as to the best 
method for making this assessment, but should bear in mind 
that research has shown that people's sense of identity 
with a community is often intuitive. Topography and 
geography may influence the shape of communities. 
Traditional counties, historic cities, districts and towns 
can all excite powerful loyalties (Department of the 
Environment, 1992:par. 4) 
 
The paragraph hints at a common history and topographical 
characteristics as potential objects of loyalties and hence of 
natural communities. This is further substantiated by the 
community index that accompanies the policy guidance, where both 
'history' and 'topography' feature prominently under the general 
headline of 'identity'. 
 
One concept of community that seems to underlie the department's 
thinking is that of community as heritage, where community, in 
the definition of Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994), is 'the 
expression of a common cultural tradition or identity - a sense 
of continuity and belonging' - relying on history for 
legitimacy. This interpretation of community is equally 
inferrable from the criticism levelled at the local government 
restructuring of the 70s that 'some authorities which emerged 
from the 1974 reorganisation are still not wholly accepted by 
all the local communities which they serve. There is still a 
feeling in some areas that history and tradition were perhaps 
disregarded in search for administrative uniformity' (Department 
of the Environment, 1991:par. 22). 
 
However, on inspection of the community index, supplementary 
understandings of community surface. The commission is 
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instructed to take more latter-day concerns like travel-to-work 
and travel-to-leisure distances and shopping opportunities and 
habits into account (i.e. various catchment areas), just as the 
remoteness of service-providing authorities and their resultant 
accessibility is seen as playing an important role. In this view 
community may be seen as the basis of collective consumption and 
for the most effective production and provision of local public 
goods, which essentially relies on a rationale drawn from 
economics (Burns et al. 1994) A final representation of 
community that can be deduced from the index is one of power and 
political influence, which is featured under the headline of 
'democracy'. It is one very much focused on the representative 
aspects of democracy, in that it stresses 'turnout in 
elections', 'the opportunity of representative groups to make an 
effective input into the decision making processes of councils', 
and 'the accountability of councils'. This is reflected in the 
statement that 'turnout in local government elections is patchy 
(;) (a) high turnout is desirable as it strengthens the 
democratic process', which assumes a correlation between high 
turnout and the democratic process that some might claim is the 
reverse.  
 
While the Policy Guidance recognizes that 'there will usually be 
widening circles of communities' and that 'the Commission should 
take account of the strength of identity associated with each 
level of community' (Department of the Environment, 1992:par. 
6), the application of the term 'natural communities' suggests 
that the communities are there to be found without much ado. If 
that was what the government had hoped for, they were 
disappointed. 
 
First of all, given the Conservative governments' attempt to 
curb the powers of local government during the 1980s4, it was 
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difficult, for many, to view the whole process and read the 
guidance in a positive vein. It was seen as yet another attack 
on local authorities and a sophisticated piece of 
gerrymandering, which would do away with some local Labour 
strongholds. In addition, the appointed chairman, Sir John 
Banham, former chairman of the CBI, was less accommodating than 
the government had expected and had very set ideas of his own 
about community, efficiency and democracy5. One example can be 
found in his speech to the Centenary Dinner of Parish Councils, 
in April 1994:  
 '(m)ost people wishing to contact their Council can do so 
by telephone; the number of telephones in use has risen 
from under 14 million in 1970 to over 35 million today. 
(..) In such circumstances, there is a strong case for 
larger rather than smaller unitary authorities with 
devolved management responsibility to the Community level 
and linked with local Parish and town Councils', 
which seems informed by a notion of local authorities as 
primarily providers of services and of the local communities as 
consumers of these, rather than local authorities as the basis 
of local democracy. While his focus on service delivery was very 
much in line with government thinking, his sizist thinking did 
not quite tally with the government's assumption that the new 
unitary authorities would primarily be based on the former 
districts (the lower-tier unit), and the proposed redrawing of 
boundaries was not unilaterally to the advantage of the 
Conservatives or up to their expectations. Conservative 
backbenchers saw parliamentary constituencies that were 
coterminous with local districts potentially vanishing from 
under their feet, and there were calls for ending the process. 
Nevertheless, the review process went on, but on two occasions 
the Commission received new guidelines, and in 1995 Sir John 
Banham resigned - evidently having been asked to do so - and a 
new chairman (Sir David Cooksey) and another four new 
commissioners and a new chief executive were put in place.  
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Natural communities? 
 
Rather than contributing to the smooth running of the process 
the community criterion mined the process from the start. It 
relied on an essentially spatial or territorial logic, which has 
come to be questioned by e.g. Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 
1991:146): 
 (w)hile the milieux in which people live quite often 
remain the source of local attachments, place does not 
form the parameter of experience; and it does not offer 
the security of the ever-familiar which traditional 
locales characteristically display. (...) Active attempts 
to re-embed the lifespan within a local milieu may be 
undertaken in various ways. Some, such as the cultivation 
of a sense of community pride, are probably too vague to 
do more than recapture a glimmer of what used to be. Only 
when it is possible to gear regular practices to specifics 
of place can re-embedding occur in a significant way: but 
in conditions of high modernity this is difficult to 
achieve. 
 
He, and others6, point to the changing conditions and social 
diversity and fragmentation of modern life, and the lack of 
commonality of experience in localities, beyond the very local. 
For people to have a sense of belonging with a territorial 
community it needs to be the immediate neighbourhood - or in 
local government parlance, the parish. It is recognized that 
increasingly people belong to communities of interest, with 
common objectives and concerns in terms of e.g. employment and 
housing, which cut across localities and which may allow a much 
more instrumental view on locality, and that their sense of 
place and of belonging to a local community may be changing and 
take second place to their sense of belonging to other 
communities (of interest).  
 
At the same time there is also an attempt to restate that the 
experience of community is both social and spatial, and that 
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there may be communities of attachment, or, in Benedict 
Anderson's typology, imagined communities based on space, and a 
feeling of commonality grounded in a territorial area; equally 
there is a concern with the essentially political project of 
arguing the potential of localities to continue to form the 
basis for the exercise of political choice and citizenship in 
spite of their diversity. Finally, it is pointed out that under 
the warm persuasive surface of 'community' the reality of 
communities may be distinctly exclusive and defensive, defined 
in negative rather than positive terms, and that the choice and 
mobility and potential of taking an instrumental view of 
locality underlying Giddens' analysis may be a far cry from the 
actual lives of a lot of people. 
 
Such questions surfaced in the Local Government Commission's 
attempt to employ the elusive term. Equally, on presenting its 
first reports, the Commission came under attack for drawing very 
different conclusions on the basis of seemingly similar local 
settings - in other words, that the pairs of local commissioners 
in review areas applied the concept of community in a less than 
consistent manner. Local authorities, who in many cases had 
entered the process reluctantly and at gun-point, and who, in 
their own understanding, tried to apply the criteria 
conscientiously, increasingly felt that they were chasing a 
moving target.  
 
In the latest phase of the review, the Commission was instructed 
by the Secretary of State to review 21 districts, in contrast to 
the former county reviews, under new guidance. A new term that 
entered the vocabulary of the review at this point was that of 
'hybridity', in that the guidance points out the possibility of 
one or more districts being granted unitary status within a 
county that otherwise remains two-tier. While still bound by the 
1992 legislation's two pillars of 'effective and convenient' 
local government and the 'identity and interests of local 
communities', the Commission, in the light of the new emphasis 
on hybridity, ended up structuring its considerations under two 
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headings: intra-authority considerations and inter-authority 
considerations, which would have to be balanced. So even if a 
community might arguably qualify for unitary status on internal 
or intra-authority grounds, the unitary solution might be 
problematic seen against the background of the wider county or 
community - inter-authority grounds. Given the legislative focus 
on effective and convenient local government, size reappeared as 
a critical parameter. The problem is summed up as follows by the 
new chief executive of the Local Government Commission, Bob 
Chilton: 
 'people's identity is often with quite small areas around 
their church, their shops, their school, maybe communities 
of 20-30,000 people at most. But given the critical mass 
of some of the services which local government has to 
deliver you need administrative units of somewhat greater 
size.'(Interview, London 28 September 1995, see also Prior 
et al. 1995:154) 
In its overview report the Commission recognizes a distinction, 
between 'effective' and 'affective' communities (communities of 
interest and attachment respectively) and that there may be 
layers of these. Some of the issues uncovered by the review is 
the lack of overlapping effective and affective communities. For 
instance, some of the 'estuary' local authorities (e.g. 
Humberside) created in the 1974 restructuring have failed to 
become affective communities, although there are still valid 
reasons for considering them effective communities. Some suburbs 
of county towns have developed an affective community of their 
own, and contrast themselves to the core of the town, despite 
the fact that they do in fact rely on the town-centre for 
employment, shopping etc. In some instances, what might be 
called an imagined counter-community - 'the Other' of some 
analyses of nationalities - plays a powerful role, which is 
often the case with the general urban-rural dichotomy, which may 
find expression in urban opposition to being landed with 'pig-
farmers'. This particular problem and, most often, a county 
town's claim for unitary status, is discussed under the headline 
of 'centrality', and the interdependence of town and country is 
judged against a geographic dimension of convenience, a socio-
economic and cultural dimension of community interests, and a 
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functional one of effectiveness. The commission's overall view 
was that 'growing suburbanisation of the countryside is reducing 
the divergence of interests between town and county', but in 
some settings this divergence was given precedence nevertheless. 
What has resulted so far is a mixed, hybrid or patchy structure, 
which may fairly reflect mixed or hybrid English communities, 
but is not necessarily a structure that will last long into the 
next millenium.  
 
It is evident that 'natural communities' was a less than clear 
criterion on which to base a review of boundaries. As one of the 
local authorities involved in the review put it: 
 'community proved an elusive and difficult concept to put 
into practice: local authorities, other interested 
parties, and the commission have all sought to develop 
their own operational definitions of 'community' with 
widely differing results'(Interview, Yorkshire, 1993) 
The commission's own comment on the task of identifying the 
territorial manifestation of commmunity is:  
 One of the root causes of the difficulties of this whole 
process of structural review (is) that we were using 
criteria which seemed plausible at first sight, but which 
have an underpinning concept that you can readily capture 
people's senses of community identity and interests when 
actually you are dealing with a much more complex set of 
behaviours. (...) (Interview, London September 1995) 
A final evaluation of community is that 
 is overused and underdefined, too general to have 
analytical value (..) and overladen with emotional 
attachments, an assertion of what should be rather than 
what is'. (Hill 1994:39) 
It is precisely this continued ability to conjure up what should 
be rather than what is that keeps it alive and kicking British 
political discourse, as evidenced in one of the documents of the 
1995 Labour Party Conference, Renewing democracy, rebuilding 
communities: 
 The basic fact is that we all live somewhere and we all 
have local loyalties. The place we live is where we want 
the help we need. So our needs have a geographical 
location. We want home helps for the old people in our 
street, a school bus for our children, a fire engine to 
respond to our 999 call. Most people also have a sense of 
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place, of local loyalty, of commitment to the other people 
who live in their area. (The Labour Party: Renewing 
democracy, rebuilding communities, Conference 95) 
 
Region/al/ism 
 
It might be argued that, in contrast to community, the concepts 
of region and regionalism are foreign to a British context and 
not at all relevant in describing the British reality. But it is 
equally arguable that regions and regionalism have reemerged, if 
not at the centre, then on the periphery of British political 
discourse, and in some form or another are there to stay. One of 
the causes of this is that for various reasons the British 
Labour Party is once more committed to some form of 
regionalisation of Britain; another major influence is the 
'invasion' of the European Union's focus on regions, which has 
triggered various concerns and attempts to come to terms with 
this new development in Britain. 
 
In Keywords Raymond Williams traces the dual meaning of 
'region(al)' as 'a distinct area or definite part' and argues 
that the latter has the more important history. In this sense 
'region(al)' is a relational concept and can only be understood 
as part of - and almost inherently as subordinate to - something 
else. He equally points to the dual connotations of regionalism: 
to suggest incomplete centralization, divisive special 
pleadings, or - the counter-argument - to make the case for 
self-government on the basis of the distinctive features and 
identity of a region. Finally he asks the question where 
'regions' and 'regional' begin. How far out of London and into 
the sticks do you have to venture for things to become 
'regional'. One latter-day dictionary takes up this perspective 
and suggests that 
 'the regions are the parts of a country that are not the 
capital city and its surroundings. ...London and the 
regions... (Collins Cobuild English Dictionary, 1995) 
In contrast, another dictionary totally ignores this 
regional/metropolitan dichotomy and matter-of-factly states that 
 'the regions (are) eight areas into which Britain is 
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divided, mainly for statistical purposes. The regions are 
South East, East Anglia, South West, West Midlands, East 
Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, North West, and North. 
The regions play no part in local government.' (Longman 
Dictionary of English Language and Culture, 1992) 
The latter explanation is interesting, not only because it 
points to the existence of well-defined regions, but even more 
so because it is misleading. 
 
The Scottish Region? 
 
What makes it misleading is that it leaves out two out of ten 
British regions - Scotland and Wales (and the additional UK 
region, Northern Ireland)- and only lists the eight English 
standard regions. This is revealing of the very common confusion 
of English and British, and in this context begs the question 
whether Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are regions. In 
spite of the above quote they are of course for statistical 
purposes, as evidenced in the Government Statistical Service's 
annual Regional Trends publication. 
 
At the same time they are, in terms of status within the British 
union, the exceptions. In the words of Michael Keating: 
 'Ever since the Union of 1707, British governments have 
practised a policy of exceptionalism for the peripheral  
nations of Scotland, Ireland and Wales.' (Garside and 
Hebbert (eds.) 1989, 166) 
The important term here is 'nation'. In political rhetoric they 
are almost invariably referred to as (ancient) nations (or 
countries) with a distinct identity, separate from that of 
England, and based on language (Wales) or civil society and 
institutions (Scotland). In addition, there is a separate 
Scottish Office (created 1885) and a Welsh Office (established 
1964). It is revealing that across the political board there 
seems to be agreement not to refer to for instance Scotland as a 
region in spite of the very different conclusions that the 
status as nation leads to. The present Conservative government's 
arguments run along the following lines: 
 'The Union between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland is one of the most successful and enduring 
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partnerships in history. Together we wield greater 
influence than we would if we split into separate nation-
states'(Conservative Research Department The British 
Constitution, n.d., 1) 
 
 'Within the Union special arrangements have evolved to 
ensure that Scotland's interests are protected and 
Scotland's identity as a nation enhanced' (Scotland in the 
union - a partnership for good, 1993, 8) 
 
 'We reject utterly the arguments of those who want 
Scotland to break away from the United Kingdom, either 
through the direct means of separation or by way of the 
slippery slope of a separate parliament. Our firm 
commitment is to the future integrity of the United 
Kingdom, secured through this House and this Parliament. 
The United Kingdom is a partnership of nations that has 
endured. We believe strongly that it is a partnership for 
good.' (Ian Lang, Secretary of State for Scotland, 
Hansard, 9 March 1993, Vol. 220 No. 139) 
Scotland's status as a distinct nation is not questioned, but 
the case made is that union makes for strength and increased 
influence, not least internationally. Exactly the opposite case 
is made by Alex Salmond, Leader of the Scottish National Party: 
 'Scotland is a long established European nation - indeed, 
one of the earliest to have a clearly-defined national 
identity within borders which have changed little over the 
centuries. (..) Independence in Europe offers Scots the 
opportunity to recover our nationhood within the new 
Europe - to move out of a provincial isolationism imposed 
on us by seeing the world at second hand, and build a new 
relationship with our neighbours as an equal partner in 
the European family of nations. (Response from Alex 
Salmond concerning Scottish Independence, n.d. 1, 2)  
Although they speak from opposite positions, the Conservatives 
and SNP unite in describing Scotland as a nation and agree that 
the choice is between independence (SNP)/the break-up of Britain 
(Conservatives) on the one hand and the status quo on the other. 
In contrast, the Labour Party is once more pledged to devolution7 
in Scotland (and Wales) if equally on the basis of acceptance of 
Scottish and Welsh nationhood8.  
                         
    
7
 defined as 'the giving of governmental or personal power to 
a person or group at a lower or more local level' in Longman 
Dictionary of English Language and Culture, 1992 
    
8
 for a dicussion of the 1970s attempts at devolution see 
Keating and Jones, 1995 
  
 
 17 
 'The United Kingdom is a partnership enriched by distinct 
and proud national identities. Proposals for devolution of 
power to Scotland have been part of the Labour tradition 
for over 100 years. Scotland has its own structure of 
local government and its own religious and social 
traditions.(..)  In Scotland we will create a parliament 
with law-making powers firmly based on the agreement 
reached in the Scottish Constitutional Convention.'(New 
Labour New life for Britain, 1996, 29-30) 
The above is the presentation of the Labour party line, but as 
indicated the Scottish Labour Party also participates in the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention, a cooperation between 
Scottish Labour, Liberal Democrats, local authorities and a 
number of other interest groups to work for the establishment of 
a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh9. In its publication 
Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Rights the argument is very 
much that of the right of the Scottish people, and the 
declaration 'A Claim of Right for Scotland' adopted at the 
inaugural meeting on the 30 March 1989 reads: 
 We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do 
hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish 
people to determine the form of Government best suited to 
their needs, and do hereby declare and pledge that in all 
our actions and deliberations their interests shall be 
paramount. 
 We further declare and pledge that our actions and 
deliberations shall be directed to the following ends: 
 To agree a scheme for an Assembly or Parliament for 
Scotland; 
 To mobilise Scottish opinion and ensure the approval for 
the Scottish people for that scheme; and 
 To assert the right of the Scottish people to secure the 
implementation of that scheme. (Scotland's Parliament. 
Scotland's Right, 1995, 10) 
The conclusion is that for all, perhaps not practical but 
definitely rhetorical purposes, the Scots are a distinct people 
with their own identity and claim to nationhood, who are in 
partnership with the English, Welsh and Northern Irish. But what 
                         
    
9
 The Convention describes itself as 'a broadly based 
representative organisation in Scotland comprising political 
parties, the majority of Scottish MPs and MEPs, trades unions, 
the churches, local authorities, the business and industrial 
community and other national organisations.' (Scotland's 
Parliament. Scotland's Right. An executive Summary. 1995) 
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political and administrative conclusions might be drawn on that 
basis is a matter of much more controversy. The Scottish 
Constitutional Convention obviously pursues the argument of the 
lack of democracy of the unwritten British constitution, the 
democratic deficit of Conservative government in Scotland, and 
the need for democratic involvement of the Scottish people. 
 'We (the Scottish or British people) have come of age. We 
are adults not children. We are citizens not subjects. We 
are partners not customers. We are the heirs of a nation 
that has always prized freedom above all else. We deserve 
something better than the secretive, centralised, self-
serving super-state that the UK has become. 
 For the Convention, this is the end of the beginning. For 
Britain's archaic and undemocratic system of government 
this is the beginning of the end. For all of us in the 
United Kingdom, it is the dawn of new hope.' (Scotland's 
Parliament. Scotland's Right. 1995, 31) 
Exclusive Labour phrasing is somewhat more cautious and aimed at 
opposing both the Conservative status quo on the one hand and 
SNP separatism on the other to achieve 'a wider democracy': 
 This (creating a Scottish parliament and a Welsh assembly) 
is a reform of the structure of government in the UK, 
retaining the essential links between Scotland, Wales and 
the rest of the UK. The aim is to strengthen our system of 
government and to reject narrow nationalism. The 
Westminster Parliament remains sovereign but will pass 
power to the Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly as 
part of our drive for a wider democracy.'(New Labour new 
life for Britain, 1996, 30) 
The SNP position is that nothing short of independence will 
deliver democracy, and consequently, "Labour and Tory are thus 
the two faces of Unionism north and south of the Border" (SNP 
News Release, 9 January 1995): 
 'The SNP believe that Scotland is currently ruled from 
Westminster by a government whose policies do little to 
reflect the needs of the people of Scotland. Scotland is 
deprived of democracy, a Conservative government rules 
Scotland, yet only a small minority of Scottish 
constituencies are held by Conservative MPs. (..) 
 Any constitutional change for Scotland and England must 
not allow one country to exercise undue influence over the 
other. The status quo is totally unsuitable in this 
respect, as is devolution. The only system which would 
pass this test of democracy is independence for Scotland.' 
(Devolution v. Independence; An Argument For 
Constitutional Change, August 1995) 
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The Conservative case against devolution stresses 'how Scotland 
Benefits from the Union': 
 'No one should underestimate the dire consequences that 
would result from the loss of that Union. It would mean 
the end of one of the most successful and enduring 
partnerships in history.' (The British Constitution, n.d., 
7) 
The alleged consequences would be that the 'Economic Benefits' 
and 'Powerful Voice' that ensue from the union would be lost, 
and that 'Higher Public Spending' would result as, presently, 
'Scotland receives 10 per cent of all UK Government spending, 
but contributes only 8.9 per cent of all taxes'. Instead, an 
additional income tax of 3p, a 'tartan tax', might be imposed, 
since such tax-levying abilities are foreseen in Labour's and 
the Liberal Democrats' proposal for devolution (The British 
Constitution, n.d). Evidently the Conservative strategy is to 
present 'Labour's Constitutional Price Tag' and to paint a 
horror vision of 'New Labour, New Danger'(Labour's 
Constitutional Price Tag, July 1996). 
 
A European Region? 
 
What does, after all, bring regions and regionalism back onto 
the Scottish (and Welsh) agenda is the EU, its regional policy 
and Committee of the Regions, which is evidently recognized by 
the political parties. While originally rejecting the Common 
Market as a non-starter for a peripheral area like Scotland, the 
SNP has now embraced European membership - but for an 
independent Scottish nation-state:   
 'The only way that Scotland will have a direct voice at 
the top table in Europe is by becoming an independent 
member state of the Community. (..) Some of the SNP's 
opponents would like to fob Scots off with regional status 
in a "Europe of the Regions". But Scotland is an ancient 
European nation, not a region.' (Response from Alex 
Salmond concerning Scottish Independence, n.d. 2, 9) 
To the SNP an example of such 'fobbing off' would probably be 
the Conservative government's presentation of 'Scotland's 
Profile in Europe': 
 'Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty will bring with it 
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the establishment of the Committee of the Regions, 
providing a new forum for the expression of Scottish 
opinion. This new Committee will give Scotland an 
additional voice at the centre of Community affairs and it 
will complement the work of the other Community 
institutions. The Committee will also be an effective 
channel for the expression of the legitimate interests of 
the nations and regions of Europe. In determining 
membership of the Committee, the Government will ensure 
that Scotland has substantial representation on it.' 
(Scotland in the Union - a partnership for good, 1993, 21) 
Where SNP contrasts the "real" nations and the "mere" regions, 
the government rhetoric parallels the two in this particular 
section. In contrast to both, the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention, using the apparently universal metaphor of 
'Scotland's Voice in Europe', is more concerned with establising 
the Scottish Parliament's role in liaising with Europe - and 
with Scottish interest groups: 
 'Scotland's Parliament will be represented in UK 
Ministerial delegations to the Council of Ministers where 
appropriate, and Scottish Ministers will lead these UK 
delegations when the areas under discussion are of 
specific relevance to Scotland. Scotland's Parliament will 
also have the power to appoint representatives to the 
Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee, in consultation with local authorities and 
other agencies.' (Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right. 
1995, 16) 
The reality of these scenarios is a matter of much contention in 
political as well as academic circles. One central line of 
argument is that 'the United Kingdom faces the problem that its 
regional institutions are woefully underequipped for the 
competitive challenge of the internal market'; that Scotland and 
Wales do have a competitive advantage in having their own 
offices with Cabinet representation, which are, however, 'highly 
dependent on Whitehall for policy leadership'(Keating and Jones, 
1995, 113); that 'in the absence of directly elected regional 
government, an intense debate as to who has the right to speak 
for the area (..) is bound to ensue and perhaps dissipate the 
effort made in lobbying externally' (Mazey and Mitchell, 1993, 
118).10  The opposite case made is that 'there is a great deal of 
                         
    
10
 for a further discussion of this aspect see Wyn Grant, 
1989, 'The Regional Organization of Business Interests and 
  
 
 21 
loose talk on the subject of European integration, heralding the 
demise of the nation state and stressing the need for the UK to 
refashion itself to maximise its influence in Brussels and its 
receipts of EU aid. (..) for all the Treaty of Maastricht's fine 
phrases about a Europe of the Regions, the substance is very 
thin'(Tindale, 1996, 49). 
 
English regions? 
  
Whatever the reality, the first 'losing out in Europe' argument 
can be used in arguing the case for Scottish and Welsh 
independence or devolution, but it has also been used by Labour 
to put the case for regional government in England. 
 'The government's reluctance to develop a rational 
structure for England's regions has put much needed 
European economic development funding at risk, and has 
undermined the capacity of the English regions to get the 
best deal for their areas (..) What is needed is a clear 
focal point for decision making, for putting together bids 
for European Programme funding, and for representation on 
the EU Committee of the Regions. (A choice for England: A 
consultation paper on Labour's plans for English regional 
government, 1995, 1, 11) 
However, the European connection is only part of Labour's 
argument for regional government in England. Another is the need 
for better co-ordination above local and below national, in 
other words, at a regional level. 
 'There is, indeed, a strong argument for English regional 
government. Many of the decisions required for government 
are most appropriately determined at a regional level, for 
it is here that the best combination of local knowledge 
and broader strategy can be applied. This is especially 
the case in respect of economic development, transport, 
land use and the public services which interact with these 
functions.(A choice for England, 1995, 8) 
Local authority co-ordinating bodies initiated from below, 
termed 'local authority regionalism', are 'a welcome development 
but they suffer from the lack of a statutory framework, and from 
the fact that they are detached from decision making at a 
                                                                
Public Policy in the United Kingdom' in Coleman and Jacek (eds.) 
Regionalism, Business Interests and Public Policy  
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regional level' (A choice for England, 1995, 13, 14). The 
Integrated Regional Offices (IROs) put in place by the 
Conservative government to coordinate the work of four major 
government departments11 are described as 'an improvement on what 
existed before', but they are inadequate and part of 'an 
extensive de facto tier of regional government', which is 
'unelected, unaccountable and largely unknown', the other 
element of which is the large number of quangos12, 'which now 
spend over £50 billion a year of public money and run many of 
our public services'(A choice for England, 1995, 1). Labour's 
argumentation covers the whole spectrum of reasons for 
regionalisation. Regional government should be there to provide 
'public accountability and democratic oversight of quangos' and 
other elected bodies, and 'strategic co-ordination' of local 
efforts, and, vis-a-vis Europe, to achieve 'economic 
development' (A choice for England, 1995, 2, 11). The problem 
that Labour is up against in putting this case is that it is 
exceedingly difficult to carve up England into natural regions 
with a distinctive identity, and that public enthusiasm for 
Labour's proposals is relatively low13, which makes it vulnerable 
to attacks from political opponents. The lack of parallellism 
between the Scottish nation and the English regions is 
vehemently pronounced by Alex Salmond and Allan Macartney (MEP): 
 'Labour are miscalculating in seeking to impose assemblies 
throughout England, merely to lend cover to their Scottish 
devolution plans.' 
 'Labour's only response to the anomalies inherent in 
devolution is to issue parrot cries about creating 
regional assemblies in England. 
                         
    
11
 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department 
of the Environment (DoE), the Department of Transport and that 
of the former Department for Education, now part of the 
Department for Education and Employment 
    
12
 quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization 
    
13
 cf. MORI's State of the Nation 1995 report conducted on 
behalf of the Joseph Rowntree Trust Ltd, which suggests that 
nearly 60 % of the population oppose giving greater powers of 
government to regions such as the West Country, the North West, 
East Anglia etc 
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 In other words, Labour are proposing assemblies for 
regions whose names sound like contenders in the 'Come 
Dancing' television programme, merely as a means of 
disguising some of the inadequacies of their Scottish 
devolution plans!' (SNP News Release, 12 January 1995) 
A central anomaly is the so-called 'West Lothian question' posed 
in the 1970s devolution debate by the anti-devolution Labour MP 
Tam Dalyell14, which asks why, after devolution, Scottish MPs 
would be entitled to decide English legislation when English MPs 
would have no say on Scottish affairs. Much the same position is 
taken by the Conservatives in their counter-argument. Labour has 
provided no answer to the 'tamnable'15 question, and 'so far 
refused to countenance any reduction' of the number of Scottish 
MPs at Westminster, 'since almost 20 per cent of Labour MPs 
represent Scottish constituencies'. Labour has been 
'backtracking on a Referendum' and 'are now beating the retreat 
and have conceded that they would have to hold a referendum in 
an attempt to dodge the unanswered questions on their 
proposals'(The British Constitution, n.d., 12). In general, 
Labour's proposals 'represent a grave threat to the future of 
the Union', 'pose a real danger to the cohesion and unity of the 
whole United Kingdom', and 'would lead to chaos and the 
                         
    
14
 described in Waller and Criddle, 1996, The Almanac of 
British Politics, 5th edition, 535, as 'an eccentric aristocrat, 
born 1932, educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, whose 
father was British minister in Bahrain in the 1930s and whose 
grandfather and great-grandfather were Governors of Bengal, 
married into a family of Scottish Labour politicians (the 
Wheatleys) and was elected in succession to a coalminer as MP 
for West Lothian in 1962 and for the redrawn seat of Linlithgow 
after 1983. (..) He has spent all but two years (..) as a 
backbencher, campaigning against Scottish devolution in the 
1970s' 
    
15
 referred to as such in Crick, Bernard, 'Ambushes and 
Advances:The Scottish Act 1998'. In: Marquand and Wright (eds.) 
The Political Quarterly, Volume 66 No 4 October-December 1995 
where he addresses it as follows: 'The West Lothian question is 
usually raised simply to discredit the whole devolution project, 
but the alleged abuse will continue so long as entrenchment of 
devolved powers is impossible. In any case it is unimportant by 
comparison with more positive reasons for or even against the 
project. The anomaly will be lived with until such time as our 
anamolous (sic!) constitution becomes numinous'. 
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inevitable break-up of the United Kingdom'; and 'Labour's plans 
for English regional assemblies stand in stark contrast to the 
Government's pragmatic and common sense approach to reforming 
local government'(The British Constitution, n.d. 1, 12, 16, 19).  
 'Conservatives believe in a very different form of 
devolution from the expensive and unnecessary extra tiers 
of regional government which our opponents propose' (The 
British Constitution, n.d., 19) 
The long-established evolutionary and practical constitution 
embodied with the wisdom of generations and grown with the 
instincts of the British people is invoked to counter the 'most 
radical package of constitutional reform ever put before the 
British people' (The British Constitution, n.d. Summary). 
Labour's problem is that not only do the Conservatives accuse 
them of 
 'aim(ing) to impose a regional government on regions that 
have no grounding in history and no sense of popular 
affinity. Few people feel as if they belong to, say, 'the 
South East' or the 'North West'. Fewer still would want a 
regional assembly to govern their affairs' (The British 
Constitution, n.d., 20); 
similar criticism can be heard from quarters that are normally 
closer to the Labour Party. The former columnist and present 
editor of the Independent Andrew Marr in Ruling Britannia: The 
Failure and Future of British Democracy (1995) is in line with 
Labour's criticism of 'the creation of unelected regional 
government, both through government agencies and through 
quangos'(Marr, 1995, 84), but he equally comments that: 
 'When Labour launched its ill-thought-out ideas for 
regional parliaments across England, these were rightly 
attacked by Tories for having little public support' 
(Marr, 1995, 84) 
John Stewart, professor of Local Government and Administration 
at the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of 
Birmingham points to a number of unresolved issues in the 
proposals for regional government and concludes 
 'Until these questions are answered it is difficult to 
assess any proposals for regional government, for without 
the answers regional government is an abstraction to which 
both advocates and opponents can ascribe whatever 
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qualities they wish. Above all it is difficult to 
establish whether the outcome would really mean 
decentralisation in practice. To answer these questions, 
it is necessary to consider what sort of regional 
government is proposed in a way that few of its advocates 
have yet faced up to.' (Stewart, 1995, 277) 
The left-of-centre New Statesman & Society in its editorial from 
10 March 1995 agrees with John Major that Labour's plans for 
English regional assemblies are 'farcical, amateurish, ill 
thought-out and contradictory', questions the underlying 
assumptions of the existence of regions, and likens the thought 
of a Labour Party committee sitting down to carve up Britain 
with 'an exercise in colonial cartography' rather than 'an 
advance for devolved democracy'(New Statesman & Society 
'Labour's local difficulty', 10 March, 1995, 5). Their 
recommendation is that the issue 'be uncoupled from that of a 
Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly' and that regions should 
not be 'imposed from above rather than emerging from below' as 
 'any attempts to "parachute" regions, whether romantic or, 
more likely, bureaucratic, into today's varied, 
multicultural England may well end in disaster. For faced 
with this unpalatable prospect, the majority in England 
may yet opt for Major's and Portillo's narrow, 
restrictive, centralised and undemocratic notion of a 
unitary British state instead' (New Statesman & Society 
'Labour's local difficulty', 10 March, 1995, 5) 
The principle of subsidiarity should be taken seriously as 
should  'the predominant tradition in England' of 'intense 
localism' (New Statesman & Society, 10 March, 1995, 5). It is 
not that there is no sense of locality and local identity in 
England, but the identification is with much smaller communities 
such as a rural town of 20-30,000 people . Another aspect in the 
discussion of identity is that 'what is more important is not 
where people identify with, but where they have strong feelings 
against' (Bob Chilton, Chief Executive of Local Government 
Commission for England, 28 September 1995). They may feel quite 
strongly about being Yorkshire and not Lancashire people, and in 
that sense have a regional identity as suggested in Linda 
Colley's analysis of the forging of British national identity. 
 'As even the briefest acquaintance with Great Britain will 
confirm, the Welsh, the Scottish and the English remain in 
many ways distinct peoples in cultural terms, just as all 
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three countries continue to be conspicuously sub-divided 
into different regions.' (Colley, 1992, 6) 
But another common response is that 'this country has never had 
much of a regional flavour16, certainly not England', and 
'generally speaking, 'local interest'/'community identity' 
cannot span more than 20 miles' (Alan Taylor, president of the 
Society of Local Authority Chief Executives, April 1993). So 
although it might be possible to define viable regions in the 
North of England, 
 'as soon as you get into the South East, the East 
Midlands, the West Midlands, where do you draw the line? 
It just all merges somewhat. So it is rather difficult in 
the core of England to find regional expressions' (Bob 
Chilton, 28 September 1995) 
and, for that reason, difficult to find the basis for popularly 
elected assemblies. It may be in recognition of this that Labour 
has opted for 'regional chambers', 'which would consist of 
nominated representatives of elected local councils'(A choice 
for England, 1995, 2)  
 'In many regions, notably the North East and North West, 
there are already moves to take this process further. But 
there are parts of England, notably in the South, in which 
regions as such are far less cohesive. So it would be 
wrong to impose an inappropriate or unwanted uniform 
system of regional government' (New Labour new life for 
Britain, 1996, 30) 
This 'taking the process further' or 'second step' would be 'the 
establishment of directly elected regional assemblies in those 
regions where public demand for these is evident'(A choice for 
England, 1995, 3). This new strategy is probably reflected in 
the title of the consultation paper: A choice for England. The 
                         
    
16
 Christopher Harvie, professor of British studies at the 
University of Tübingen, who describes himself as 'a Scot living 
and working in Germany, and spending most of my vacations in 
Wales', from a very Scottish vantagepoint refers to the 'natural 
regionality of the British Isles - the persistence of distinct 
national traditions and the comparative strength of civil 
society' in his book The Rise of Regional Europe, 1994, in which 
he equally adds to the 'regional' vocabulary by making a 
distinction between 'regionalisation, the chopping-up of 
problems into manageable areas, which has now given way to a 
subjective and aggressive regionalism'(Harvie, 1994, 4, 74).  
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proposal of a two-phase, voluntary approach would also seem to 
be an attempt to counter the Conservative criticism of an 
expensive and corrupt additional layer of bureaucracy and the 
local government and academic criticism that Labour's imposed 
new tier of regional government will further undermine local 
(authority) democracy. The New Statesman & Society presented the 
Conservative case as follows: 
 'For the Conservatives, regional assemblies are a gift. 
They can be portrayed as monstrous, undesired 
bureaucracies, stuffed with power-hungry councillors. The 
Prime Minister already has them in his sights. "What 
powers would they have?" he inquired in December, 
reasonably enough. "How would they relate to local 
government? Would the assemblies be able to raise new 
taxes?" The polite word for Labour's plans is 
"embryonic".'(New Statesman & Society, 'Regions all 
round?', 3 February 1995, 25) 
Labour's response, in A choice for England is: 
 'Far from creating another tier of bureaucracy, Labour's 
proposals will make the existing one more accountable, 
coherent and democratic. The new regional bodies, which we 
propose to call "regional chambers", would grow out of 
local authority regional co-ordination. Rather than being 
in competition with elected councils, they would be their 
regional voice.'(A choice for England, 1995, 2)  
 
Regional or local government? 
 
A final question concerning the regions is how they would relate 
to local government, which brings us back to the first part of 
the paper. One bid comes from the Institute of Public Policy 
Research, which - in spite of being called 'Blairite' in 
Conservative parlance (The British Constitution, n.d., 12) - 
critically assesses whether 'devolution to English regions 
(would) help strengthen local government?' (Tindale, 1996, 50) 
 'Supporters of regionalism argue that power would be drawn 
down from the centre, not up from localities. This is a 
fine principle, but ignores that fact that much of the 
business of central government involves overseeing and 
constraining the work of local authorities. Local 
government realises the threat which regional authorities 
might pose, and has traditionally opposed 
regionalisation.'(Tindale, 1996, 50) 
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 'Many of the functions currently performed by central 
government have in the past, often the recent past, 
belonged to local authorities. A radical decentralising 
government ought to give these powers back to local 
government, not allocate them to a regional halfway house. 
It ought also to consider whether further powers could 
feasibly be devolved to the local level. This would be a 
true application of subsidiarity' (Tindale, 1996, 5) 
The government's thinking behind the capping of finances, the 
removal of functions and of services having been put up for 
compulsive competitive tendering (CCT) was to achieve 'a 
reduction in unnecessary bureaucracy and extra tiers of 
government; the implementation of competition and tests for 
efficiency wherever possible; and the transformation of local 
authorities from 'providers' to 'enablers''(Local government - 
the Conservative Approach, April 1995, 1). Equally efficiency 
and reducing bureaucracy was part of the argument for the 
structural review. In contrast to the procedure chosen in 
England, in Scotland and Wales the respective Secretaries of 
State simply replaced the existing two-tier structure (which, 
incidentally, in Scotland consisted of regional councils divided 
into district councils) by single-tier, all-purpose or unitary 
councils. By many Scotsmen and Welshmen this was seen as yet 
another proof of Westminster dictating Wales and Scotland, but 
in view of the very divisive process in England, a lot of 
English authorities came to envy the two nations their lack of 
'consultation', and there is growing realisation in Scotland and 
Wales that there may be something to say for not having spent 
all energy on proving the case of community. In addition, some 
Labour strategists might have wished for a more successful 
Conservative across-the-board installing of unitary councils, 
since that would produce a convincing argument for regional 
government. But even the hybrid structure might be conducive. In 
the words of Bob Chilton: 
 'as we move into this hybrid structure, we may be limiting 
the ability of local government to manage strategically 
because it is being divided into a larger number of 
smaller authorities. But in so doing we are creating the 
means and the need for regional government because you can 
argue that our counties were too small anyway for many of 
the strategic issues that they face. (..) I'd imagine, in 
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the next 10 years we'll see some form of regional 
government in England despite (..) its difficulties. Such 
is the nature of the issues and the context within which 
we lead our lives that for some purposes you need an 
administrative body that transcends even our counties' 
(Bob Chilton, 28 September 1995) 
It is arguable that in some sense the Conservative government 
has paved the way for devolution in Scotland and Wales: 
 'the Labour Party is arguing for the assemblies for 
Scotland and Wales - in effect a regional government 
forum, so the Labour Party itself would have to examine 
government beneath those regional assemblies, otherwise 
these two countries would have been overgoverned. A 
regional government, a county government, a district 
government, too much government' (Bob Chilton, 28 
September 1995) 
A more negative evaluation of the consequences of the 
restructuring is that - in the case of Scotland - 'the prospect 
is that parliamentary devolution of power would become executive 
centralisation of power, once the limitations of small 
authorities become clear. The future prospects for local 
democracy are not great' (Midwinter, 1995, 139). Another 
viewpoint is that e.g. Strathclyde, one of the now abolished 
regional councils of Scotland, 'turned out to be precisely the 
right size and weight to take a vigorous part in the development 
of Europe of the Regions.' (New Statesman & Society, 'Fuzzy 
democracy', 11 March 1994). In the case of Strathclyde, the 
alleged right size and weight for European action was a 
population of 2,290,700, by far the largest, in terms of 
population, pre-restructuring region in Scotland. (The Counties 
and Regions of the UK, 1994). It is obvious that the question of 
size is a central and contentious one in the regional - and 
local government - debate. What is the natural size of a 
locality for people to identify with, what is the right size of 
area for people to exercise their political choice within, what 
is a viable size for service delivery, what is a sensible size 
for strategic (whatever that means) planning, and what is the 
most conducive size for a region to interact with Europe? 
 
Future prospects 
  
 
 30 
 
So for all the rhetoric employed what are the prospects for the 
future? In 1991, prior to the most recent British general 
election, Chris Moore (1991) described the Conservative attitude 
to regionalism as principled opposition, the Liberal Democrats' 
as principled commitment17, and that of the Labour Party as 
pragmatic evolution, and argued that 
 'only if the Conservative Party is re-elected is the 
status quo likely to be maintained. Any other combination 
of government formation increases the prospects of the 
introduction of regional government' (Moore, 1991, 223-
224) 
His attitude to the relative importance of the British domestic 
 scene and the European connection was that 
 'whilst some aspects of European development have 
supported the regional articulation of interests, in 
particular around the European Regional Development Funds, 
it remains the case that the key decisions about the 
development of Europe remain locked into a process which 
operates through existing nation-states. There is thus no 
clear causal link between Europeanization and European 
regionalism. Domestic political considerations remain the 
likely key to the future of the regional debate in the UK' 
(Moore, 1991, 239-240). 
This viewpoint seems to have been borne out, and in a more 
recent, pre-the-inevitable-1997-general-election, evaluation of 
the same issue, Keating and Jones (1995) agree with the 
evaluation of the British domestic scenario, and, in addition, 
lament the likely fate of especially English regions on the 
European scene: 
 'Regional policies and Community government have been seen 
as extensions of Westminster politics. This is likely to 
be untenable in the future. Demands for Scottish self-
government are too strong for any future non-Conservative 
government to resist. (..) The peripheral English regions 
lack even the advantage of their own central departments 
(the Scottish and Welsh Offices). Across the British 
periphery, there are concerns about the inadequacy of 
infrastructure or public policies to prepare the regions 
for the competitive challenge. It is little wonder that a 
                         
    
17
 a slightly less academic account can be found in New 
Statesman & Society, 3 February, 1995, which claims that 'the 
Liberal Democrats stand for unashamed federalism throughout the 
UK 
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1990 Report for the Commission identifies British regions 
as ill endowed to face it'(Keating & Jones, 1995, 112-
113). 
And the British regions which the European Union seems to deal 
with are Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the eight 
English standard regions, which, it is recognized, 'unlike these 
territories (the three Celtic nations) (..) have no 
administrative functions, and exist mainly as statistical 
units'(Portrait of the Regions Volume 2, 1993, 161). Against 
this backdrop the next general election seems, as ever,  very 
important for the prospects of British regionalism. But even if 
the predicted Labour triumph results, it is still highly 
unpredictable whether the future will bring continued regional 
administration or some form of highly contested regional 
government and the called-for strategic planning. For one thing, 
many commentators claim that, for all the rhetoric, Labour 
might, once in office, be less enthusiatic about delivering on 
all the promises made; that they might once more find it easier 
to pursue other elements of their programme from a comfortable 
power position in Westminster and Whitehall, even if some form 
of devolution to Scotland might be unavoidable. One aspect in 
this is the parliamentary time available for new legislation, to 
which regionalism might become subservient. Some cynics would 
claim that behind the official party lines devolution, local 
government administration and regionalism divide both Labour and 
the Conservatives, if not the Liberal Democrats; that the 
Conservatives have harboured and may still harbour 'closet 
regionalists' (New Statesman & Society, 3 February, 1995) just 
as  Labour ranks would include staunch anti-devolutionists in 
the vein of Tam Dalyell. 
 
At this point it might be appropriate to return to region/alism 
as a keyword and to revisit an article written in 1974, in the 
wake of Britain's entry into the Common Market and its encounter 
with European regional policy (Rhodes, 1974). The article opens 
as follows 
 'The subject of regionalism places almost impossible 
strains on the flexibility of the English language. This 
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one word is used to cover such diverse subject areas as 
national economic planning, political devolution, 
administrative deconcentration, and local government 
reform. As a result there is considerable confusion 
surrounding the subject'. (Rhodes, 1974, 105) 
Twenty-three years on, confusion still abounds. But then clarity 
in the keywords used is not necessarily the stuff that political 
discourse is made of. 
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